Kathleen D. Walker (42 ECAB 603) 
mq: Kathleen D. Walker (42 ECAB 603) [1991] 42ECAB603 Docket No. 91-6 

In the Matter of KATHLEEN D. WALKER and DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR LOGISTICS CENTER, TINKER AIR FORCE BASE, Okla. 

Docket No. 91-6; Submitted on the Record; 
Issued April 19, 1991 

Before MICHAEL J. WALSH, GEORGE E. RIVERS, 
DAVID S. GERSON 

The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof in establishing that she sustained cardiac and emotional conditions in the performance of duty. 
On August 3, 1988, appellant, then a 46-year-old computer operator, filed a notice of occupational disease alleging that her cardiac condition and acute anxiety were caused or aggravated by her work. Appellant stopped work on March 15, 1988 and did not return. 1 
In a February 9, 1989 letter, the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs requested that appellant submit factual and medical evidence concerning her claimed condition. The Office requested that appellant provide a detailed chronological description of particular work factors that she believed caused her condition. The Office also requested that she provide a physician's reasoned opinion explaining how specific work factors caused or aggravated her condition. 
Appellant subsequently submitted an August 31, 1985 report from Dr. David West, a Board-certified family practitioner, who noted treating appellant for allergic rhinitis that was aggravated by "certain intermittent working conditions," particularly sewer odors. Dr. West recommended that sewer odors be excluded from appellant's work station. A January 20, 1987 audiology report indicated that appellant had normal hearing. Appellant also submitted nursing notes, disability certificates, and employing establishment medical reports noting her complaints and treatment due to alleged allergic responses to fumes and odors. 
In a January 15, 1988 report, Dr. Kevin Hubbard, an osteopath, noted appellant's complaints of nasal congestion, sore throat, and 

1 In an accompanying August 3, 1987 notice of traumatic injury, appellant alleged that an air conditioner emitted an "offensive odor" that caused her to experience "extreme nausea and severe headache." Other evidence of record also indicates that appellant filed claims in January 1988, for bronchitis, and August 1985, for fume exposure, both of which were denied. 

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hoarseness. Appellant told the doctor that these symptoms began shortly after being exposed to powdered ink. Dr. Hubbard recommended that appellant be moved to a "more suitable work environment . . . as it may be a cause of her symptoms." 
In a January 21, 1988 report, Dr. Bill Edwards, an osteopath, noted treating appellant for bronchitis and an allergic-viral upper respiratory infection. Appellant advised the doctor that she was exposed to ink dust and rapid temperature changes at work. The doctor stated that those conditions "may" exacerbate her symptoms and he recommended that she avoid " offending circumstances." 
In a February 7, 1988 report, Dr. Hubbard noted appellant's complaints of chest and back pain that worsened with breathing cold air. Objective findings were "unremarkable." 
In an April 10, 1988 report, Dr. Edwards noted appellant's complaint of chest congestion that she felt was aggravated by warm temperatures at work. The doctor noted that he could not rule out environmental stimuli as a cause of her condition. He also noted her complaint of chest pain that she felt was due to her job. 
In a January 9, 1989 report, Dr. Moorman Prosser, a Board-certified psychiatrist, noted examining appellant on December 19, 1988 and reported her complaints of a March 16, 1988 nervous breakdown at home. Dr. Prosser noted that, in November 1988, appellant was terminated due to excessive sick leave use and stated that she felt that the emotional trauma she experienced during the two prior years at work caused her to use the sick leave. During these two years, appellant was transferred from one work area to another with a high noise level. In the prior work station, appellant reported being harassed. Appellant also alleged a physical reaction (nausea, headaches, irritability, and panic episodes) to chemicals from a sewage treatment plant and from chemical odors emitted by the employing establishment's air conditioning system. The doctor also noted appellant's complaints concerning dry ink exposure. Appellant reported being treated for feelings of hopelessness by a psychologist, about 13 years earlier while her son was hospitalized, and she also reported going to a psychiatric counseling center several times in 1981. Dr. Prosser diagnosed a generalized anxiety state with paranoid features and noted psychological test findings. He noted her family and employment history and found that her work "added to the paranoid reactions . . . and it was quite possible that the paranoid features account for the development of much of the anxiety which she suffers." Dr. Prosser concluded: "[Appellant] suffers an emotional impairment due to the severe anxiety reaction that was precipitated by her employment ....The paranoid features that developed and were magnified by her 

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stresses led to reactions that led to her dismissal from her employment." 
In an April 10, 1989 statement, appellant, who worked at the employing establishment since July 1983, stated that, on January 13, 1984, she advised her supervisor that the dry ink in a machine she worked with, a Xerox 9700, caused breathing difficulties and stomach sickness. She stated that she was advised to continue working with the 9700 and that, thereafter, she had flu-like symptoms. Appellant noted being nervous and short-tempered and having headaches, nausea, and disorientation while working with this machine. She stated that in July 1985 a sewage treatment plant near the employing establishment began "emitting a very foul odor" and that this caused her to miss work on specific dates. From March 1986 to January 1987, appellant stated that she was temporarily transferred to another location where she experienced increased noise that left her ears ringing. She noted that her problems (including depression, nervousness, forgetfulness, low noise tolerance, stomach and digestion problems, hair loss, and weight gain) increased gradually until January 15, 1987 when she began crying uncontrollably and had to leave work. She stated that her symptoms resolved, except for some hearing loss and stomach problems, after she was transferred to her regular work station on January 17, 1987 but that cold and flu-like symptoms, including chest pain, returned when she again began working on the 9700. She reported continued problems with the sewage fumes and noted that, on August 27, 1987, the air conditioner began emitting a dead fish odor that made her ill. She reported that, on February 11, 1988, she was temporarily transferred away from the main computer room and had no more chest pain until March 16, 1988 when she " bottomed out" at the prospect of having to return to her former duty station. She reported that her complaints to management only served to worsen her relationship with her supervisors. She stated that one supervisor, Ms. Spurgeon, berated her, wrote her up for "small" infractions, and gave her a bad appraisal. 
The employing establishment submitted undated responses to appellant's contentions. Ms. Spurgeon stated that appellant "complained about many health problems" and did not like working with the 9700 although coworkers also had to work with that machine. Appellant was "irritable and short- tempered no matter where she was assigned." Ms. Spurgeon stated that the sewage plant occasionally did produce unpleasant odors although this was rarely discernible in the room where appellant worked. Other employees did not complain of the odor. Ms. Spurgeon stated that in January 1988, when equipment was moved to a new area, there 

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were some temporary air conditioning problems that were rectified. Only appellant complained. Ms. Spurgeon noted that supervisors tried to accommodate appellant. She reported becoming upset with appellant, and giving her an oral admonishment, on January 22, 1988 when she improperly handled critical computer tapes. Ms. Spurgeon stated that, on January 28, 1988, she gave appellant an interim appraisal that noted "some areas that she would have to correct if she expected a fully successful appraisal." Ms. Spurgeon stated that appellant had nonemployment stress due to problems with one of her sons, a divorce, termination from two earlier jobs, and the death of her mother. 
The employing establishment also noted appellant's job duties and reported that she filed numerous grievances concerning disciplinary actions taken against her. An admonishment for quarrelling and inciting to quarrel on January 26, 1981 was not resolved nor was a grievance of an admonishment for improper handling of a critical batch of computer tapes on January 22, 1988. A grievance of an admonishment for sleeping on the job on June 29, 1985 was resolved and removed from appellant's file. Appellant also received sick leave abuse counselling in October 1987, a reprimand for unauthorized absence on February 5, 1988, and was placed in enforced sick leave status on July 22, 1988. On January 28, 1988, appellant was relieved of duties requiring exposure to dry ink. On October 28, 1988, she was terminated due to excessive absences. The employing establishment also submitted another listing of claimed employment incidents from appellant, similar to the April 10, 1989 statement noted above. 
In a June 28, 1989 letter, the Office advised appellant that she had submitted insufficient evidence and requested that she submit a rationalized medical opinion addressing causal relationship between her claimed condition and reported work incidents. 
In an August 8, 1989 letter responding to an Office request for additional evidence, appellant's representative advised that appellant was terminated from a prior job, with the State of Oklahoma, due to excessive leave without pay caused by the illness of her and her son. The representative stated that allergy testing of appellant was "negative with the Zerox printing ink." In light of this, the representative contended that the only explanation for appellant's symptoms was "extreme stress." 
By compensation order dated September 27, 1989, the Office rejected appellant's claim on the ground that she did not submit rationalized medical evidence establishing that her current condition was causally related to factors of her employment. 

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Appellant subsequently requested a hearing that was held on March 29, 1990. At the hearing, appellant submitted an article from a periodical concerning indoor air-related illness. Appellant testified that a coworker " harassed" her for about a year and physically threatened her, in 1986, in front of three coworkers. 
By decision dated and finalized on July 23, 1990, the hearing representative affirmed the September 27, 1989 decision. The hearing representative found that the evidence did not establish that the claimed condition was causally related to employment factors. The hearing representative stated that appellant alleged that odors, reactions to dry ink and chemicals, lack of ventilation, harassment, feeling unliked, being transferred, and noise caused her condition. However, the hearing representative stated that a transfer would not give rise to a compensable condition and that, for the other claimed work factors, appellant had not submitted rationalized medical evidence discussing why her condition was caused or aggravated by the specific work factors. 
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof in establishing that she sustained cardiac and emotional conditions in the performance of duty. 
Workers' compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is somehow related to an employee's employment. There are situations where an injury or illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the coverage of workers' compensation. These injuries occur in the course of the employment and have some kind of causal connection with it but nevertheless are not covered because they are found not to have arisen out of the employment. Disability is not covered where it results from an employee's frustration over not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold a particular position, or secure a promotion. On the other hand, where disability results from an employee's emotional reaction to his regular or specially assigned work duties or to a requirement imposed by the employment, the disability comes within coverage of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.2 
Appellant has alleged that her work has caused or aggravated her cardiac and emotional conditions. She has, in general, alleged that odors, reaction to dry ink and chemicals, improper ventilation, harassment, sick leave matters, disputes with coworkers and supervisors, unfair evaluations, transfers, and noise caused her condition. The record establishes that there were occasional odors from a nearby sewage plant, that appellant worked with dry ink, and 

2 Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976). 

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that there were isolated problems with the employing establishment's air conditioner. Because appellant encountered these conditions in the performance of her regular or specially assigned duties, these would constitute employment factors under the Act. With regard to appellant's complaint of noise exposure, everyday noise encountered as part of appellant's regular or specially assigned duties would constitute an employment factor. To the extent that disputes and incidents alleged as constituting harassment by coworkers and supervisors are established as occurring and arising from appellant's performance of her regular or specially assigned duties, these could constitute employment factors.3 
The Board notes, however, that unfounded perceptions of harassment, reactions to sick leave matters and reactions to transfers do not constitute employment factors.4 Consequently, these are not considered to be employment factors. Moreover, reactions to performance appraisals, without more, are not covered by the Act. Nor are reactions to assessments of performance covered by the Act. Where the evidence demonstrates that the employing establishment has neither erred nor acted abusively in administration of personnel matters coverage will not be afforded.5 There is no evidence in this case that the employing establishment did not act reasonably in the administration of personnel matters. 
Appellant's burden of proof is not discharged by the fact that she has identified employment factors which may give rise to a compensable disability under the Act. To establish her occupational disease claim that she has sustained an emotional condition in the performance of duty appellant must submit the following: (1) factual evidence identifying and supporting employment factors or incidents alleged to have caused or contributed to her condition; (2) rationalized medical evidence establishing that she has an emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence establishing that the identified compensable employment factors are causally related to her emotional condition.6 Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence that includes a physician's rationalized opinion on the issue of whether there is a 

3 See Pamela R. Rice, 38 ECAB 838, 842-43 (1987) (harassment can constitute an employment factor if it is shown that the incidents constituting the claimed harassment actually occurred). But cf. Walter Asberry, 36 ECAB 686, 690 (1985); Helen Marotte (Walter E. Marotte), 36 ECAB 670, 672 (1985) (where the Board held that disciplinary actions brought against an employee by the employing establishment did not constitute a reaction to assigned work duties where the action was initiated due to the employee's own misconduct). 
4 See Ruthie M. Evans, 41 ECAB 416 (1990) (mere perceptions and feelings alone are not compensable under the Act); Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 ( 1990) (matters involving the use of leave are administrative and personnel matters and are not related to an employee's regular or specially assigned work duties); Lillian Cutler, supra note 2 (where the Board held that frustration due to a desire to work in a particular environment did not constitute an employment factor). 
5 Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff'd on recon., .42 ECAB 566 ( 1991). 
6 See Cardwell, supra note 4. 

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causal relationship between the claimant's diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors. The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant, must be one of reasonable medical certainty and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by appellant.7 
Appellant has submitted no rationalized medical evidence discussing how and why any specific employment factor would cause or aggravate her emotional condition. Although Dr. Prosser supported causal relationship between appellant's emotional condition and her employment, he did not provide medical rationale explaining the medical or psychological mechanics by which specific work factors caused or aggravated her emotional condition. Dr. Prosser also did not explain why appellant's condition could not be attributed to her prior emotional problems that are documented in the record. Therefore, Dr. Prosser's report is insufficient to establish that appellant's emotional condition was caused or aggravated by her employment. 
Other medical reports of record do not affirmatively support causal relationship between specific work factors and appellant's current condition. Drs. West, Edwards, and Hubbard submitted several reports noting appellant's complaints that odors or temperature changes in the employing establishment caused her various symptoms. However, these physicians did not provide a rationalized opinion explaining how and why a particular work factor would cause or aggravate a specific condition. For example, in a January 21, 1988 report, Dr. Edwards stated that exposure to ink dust and rapid temperature changes "may" exacerbate appellant's condition. This opinion on causal relationship is of little probative value as it unrationalized and speculative.8 Additionally, with regard to appellant's allergies, her representative noted, in his August 8, 1989 letter, that testing for allergies was negative and contended that her condition was due to work stress.9 As noted above, appellant has submitted insufficient evidence to establish that she has any condition resulting from factors of her employment. 10 

7 Id. 
8 See Leonard J. O'Keefe, 14 ECAB 42, 48 (1962) (where the Board held that medical opinions based upon an incomplete history or which are speculative or equivocal in character have little probative value). 
9 Although a copy of this test is not of record, there is no evidence of record contradicting this assertion of appellant's representative. 
10 At the March 29, 1990 hearing, appellant submitted an article from a periodical. However, the Board has held that newspaper clippings, medical texts and excerpts from publications are of no evidentiary value in establishing the necessary causal relationship to establish that a claimed condition is related to an employee's federal employment as such materials are of general application and are not determinative of whether the specific condition claimed is related to the particular employment factors alleged by the employee. William C. Bush, 40 ECAB 1064 (1989). 

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For these reasons, appellant has not met her burden of proof. 
The July 23, 1990 Office of Workers' Compensation Programs' decision is affirmed. 




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